Evaluation of Medicaid Expansion on Food Insecurity Amongst Households with a Disability by Douglass, Trinity
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Masters Theses Graduate School 
5-2021 
Evaluation of Medicaid Expansion on Food Insecurity Amongst 
Households with a Disability 
Trinity Douglass 
tdougl18@vols.utk.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes 
Recommended Citation 
Douglass, Trinity, "Evaluation of Medicaid Expansion on Food Insecurity Amongst Households with a 
Disability. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2021. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/6192 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and 
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: 
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Trinity Douglass entitled "Evaluation of Medicaid 
Expansion on Food Insecurity Amongst Households with a Disability." I have examined the final 
electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Agricultural 
and Resource Economics. 
Jacqueline, Yenerall, Major Professor 
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance: 
Jada Thompson, Xuqi Chen 
Accepted for the Council: 
Dixie L. Thompson 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
 
 
Evaluation of Medicaid Expansion on Food Insecurity 






A Thesis Presented for the  
Master of Science 
Degree 












Food insecurity is disproportionately high amongst households that include someone with 
a disability. This population is also more likely to incur higher health care expenses related to 
their disability or secondary diseases. Higher health care expenditures may limit a household’s 
ability to purchase a sufficient quantity of food, which increases their risk of becoming food 
insecure. Increased access to free or subsidized health insurance may reduce either current 
expenditures on health care, or the concern with the potential of incurring high medical bills in 
the future, either of which may improve a household’s food security status. Therefore, this paper 
utilizes the expansion of Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act as a natural experiment to 
investigate the relationship between increased access to health care and food insecurity amongst 
households that include someone with a disability.  Data for this project came from the 2011 to 
2018 Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Food Security Supplement (FSS). A Fixed Effects 
Difference and Difference (FE-DD) was used to estimate the effect of Medicaid expansion, 
which occurred in three different treatment periods 2014, 2015, and 2016.  The overall treatment 
effect estimate is interpreted using the Goodman-Bacon decomposition method. The results from 
this paper suggests that Medicaid expansion had no significant effect on household food security 
amongst households with someone with a disability.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
Households that are food insecure lack adequate access to safe and nutritious foods and are 
at an increased risk for hunger and poor health outcomes (Bickel et al., 2000; Gunderson and 
Ziliak, 2014; USDA, 2020). Having a household member with a disability increases the risk for 
food insecurity because people with a disability are often paid less, less likely to be employed, and 
incur additional expenditures related to their disability (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013). In 2009 
food insecurity amongst households with a working-age adult with a disability was 24.8% 
compared to 12% amongst households without someone with a disability in the United States 
(Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013b). Increasing access to affordable health insurance may reduce 
the financial burden associated with relatively higher medical expenditures that disproportionately 
impact individuals with a disability. The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) gave states the option 
to expand Medicaid to adults, aged 18 to 65, with incomes less than 138% of the federal poverty 
line (FPL). Prior to Medicaid expansion, adults with a disability could qualify for Medicaid but 
eligibility was based on stringent disability and income guidelines that varied by state (Musumeci, 
Chidambaram, and O’Mally, 2019). Thus, Medicaid expansion may benefit low-income 
individuals with a disability by simplifying the enrollment criteria and expanding access to those 
who did not previously meet the disability requirements. This project will investigate the effect of 
Medicaid expansion, which began in 2014, on food insecurity amongst households that include an 
individual between the ages of 18 to 65 that has a disability. Setting these criteria excludes 
individuals who would dually qualify for Medicare and Medicaid. 
For non-institutionalized adults with a disability, there were four main pathways to qualify 
for Medicaid prior to the 2014 Medicaid expansion: the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
pathway, the medically needy pathway, the buy-in program, and the seniors and people with 
disabilities pathway that expands the income and or asset limits beyond SSI (Musumeci et al., 
2019). The SSI pathway is the only pathway that is federally mandated for states and is adopted in 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  In all but eight states all individuals that qualify for SSI 
automatically qualify for Medicaid. All states except Alabama have at least one additional pathway 
for people with a disability to qualify for Medicaid (Musumeci et al., 2019). For an individual to 
qualify for Medicaid through one of these disability pathways, they not only have to meet strict 
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limitations on asset and income requirements, but also have a qualified disability based on federal 
regulations (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019a).  
The ACA created a fifth pathway allowing individuals to qualify through Medicaid 
expansion. The Medicaid expansion pathway only includes an income criterion and thus eliminates 
the barriers that individuals may face in receiving approval based upon their disability. 
Additionally, even in states with seniors and people with the highest income thresholds for 
individuals with a disability (100% FPL), the income threshold through Medicaid expansion is 
higher. This increases accessibility for individuals that have a disability and an income of less than 
138% of the FPL but do not meet the guidelines provided through the disability pathway 
regulations, household income or assets exceeds the states previous limits through the disability 
pathways, or individuals that are waiting for approval through the disability pathways. The 
expansion pathway was adopted in 2014 by 24 states and the District of Columbia and five 
additional states adopted in 2015 and 2016 (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2020).  
Medicaid expansion was instituted as part of the ACA’s goals to increase affordable health 
care access (U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2021). However, an indirect benefit 
of the increased access to health insurance is the likely reduced financial burden on households 
that were previously uninsured or paying unsubsidized healthcare premiums. This improvement 
in household financial security may also result in improved food security, particularly amongst 
households with a disability, given their increased likelihood of experiencing high medical 
expenditures and low household food security.  
Medicaid and increased access to health care have been associated with several measures 
of increased financial security amongst low-income households. Medicaid expansion through the 
ACA, as well as past expansions of the Medicaid program, were found to have reduced the 
probability of low-income households having a medical collection balance exceeding $1000, 
reduced bankruptcy filings, and increased credit scores, which are in post-secondary benefits of 
Medicaid expansion (Caswell and Waidmann, 2017). In a county-wide study in California, 
Medicaid expansion was found to reduce the amount of new high-interest payday loans (Allen et 
al., 2017). Additionally, Medicaid expansion was found to change attitudes towards financial 
stability. Medicaid expansion was identified to reduce stress related to paying rent or mortgages, 
and stress of accessing nutritious foods for households below 138% of the FPL (Kino, Sato, and 
Kawachi, 2018). Their research indicates that Medicaid likely improves low-income households’ 
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financial well-being and sense of financial stability. While Medicaid and health care access are 
believed to contribute to improved overall financial permanence, there is little research 
investigating the impact of health care access, or Medicaid, on the financial stability of people with 
a disability. This project’s analysis will both expand on current research of improved food security 
increased access to health care and contribute new information on how Medicaid expansion 
provides stability to people with a disability. 
This analysis investigates the effect of Medicaid expansion has on food security status of 
low-income households with a disability using data from the Current Population Survey Food 
Security Supplement (CPS-FSS), from the years 2011-2018. The contribution of this analysis to 
the literature on food security is twofold. First, we will use a fixed effects difference-in-difference 
(FE-DD) model to estimate the relationship between Medicaid expansion and food insecurity 
amongst low-income households with a disability. Prior research on the effect of Medicaid 
expansion on food insecurity has focused on the entire population that is eligible for Medicaid 
through the new expansion guidelines (Moellman, 2018). This study found that Medicaid 
expansion decreased food insecurity only in households that were enrolled in SNAP. This project 
will expand on this by focusing on the impact that this policy change had specifically on 
households with a disability, allowing for an understanding of some of the heterogeneous effects 
of Medicaid expansion. Second, we will use the Goodman-Bacon decomposition, a method not 
currently applied in Medicaid literature, to interpret the findings. The decomposition as proposed 
by Goodman-Bacon allows for a clearer interpretation of time variation in the difference-in-
difference models, identifying where variation in the treatment effect estimate is produced and 







Households that are food insecure experience uncertainty related to or the inability to 
access  an adequate amount of nutritious food (USDA, 2020). Given the relationship between food 
insecurity and other nutrition or health outcomes it has become a severe economic and public 
health concern. Food security is a complex measurement of overall household well-being, 
indicating household financial struggle and is measured through a standardized 18-question survey 
called the Core Food Security Module (CFSM) (Bickel et al., 2000). The CFSM asks questions 
relating to how a household’s purchasing and food consumption is affected by the household’s 
budgetary constraints. Food insecurity can be broken into low food security and very-low food 
security. Households are classified as having low food security if they answer affirmatively to 
three or more food-insecure conditions in the CFSM, which captures concern about food adequacy, 
and possibility of reduction in food quality, but does not indicate a reduction in food intake. 
Households are classified as having very-low food security if they affirmatively answer six or 
more food insecure conditions for households without children and 8 or more for households with 
children (USDA, 2020).  
Previous research has investigated the relationship between socioeconomic, demographic, 
and household composition and impacts on food insecurity in the United States. Household income 
is often a key indicator for food insecurity, as households at or below the FPL are more likely to 
experience food insecurity than households with incomes exceeding the FPL (Gunderson and 
Gruber, 2001; Gunderson, Kreider, and Pepper, 2011). While household income is a significant 
determinant of household food security there are still many households that exceed the FPL that 
are food insecure and other households below the FPL that remain food secure indicating that 
household income is not sufficient in determining households food security status (Bhattacharya, 
Currie, and Haider, 2004; Gunderson et al., 2011). Capital and assets protect households from 
income volatility and food insecurity (Gunderson et al., 2011). Households that are food insecure 
are also more likely to face income shocks and experience a greater variance in income compared 
to households that are food secure (Gunderson and Gruber, 2001). Having more than two months 
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of income in liquid assets significantly reduces the risk of food insecurity (Gunderson and Gruber, 
2001). 
Household characteristics such as being in a single income household, geographical area 
(with Mississippi experiencing the highest food insecurity rates), and people of color have all been 
found to be significant in increasing the likelihood of a household being food insecure (Gunderson, 
2019; Gunderson, Engelhard, and Waxman, 2014). Additionally, having children and someone in 
the household having a disability increases the household’s likelihood of being food insecure 
(Gunderson, 2019; Gunderson and Ziliak, 2014). Having a disability remained a significant 
determinant of household food insecurity even after controlling for income, capital, and assets, the 
three main financial predictors of food insecurity (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013a; Gunderson, 
2019; Schwatz, Buliung, and Wilson, 2019). 
Beyond concerns about adequate nutrition and disrupted eating patterns, food insecurity 
remains a serious public health concern due to the increased prevalence of chronic diseases, 
including hypertension and coronary heart disease in food insecure households (Gregory and 
Coleman-Jensen, 2017; Schwatz et al., 2019). Households that are food insecure utilize health care 
more often and have more emergency room visits than households that are food secure (Brucker, 
2017). Despite experiencing poorer health outcomes, food insecure households are also less likely 
to have health insurance coverage (Gunderson and Gruber, 2001). These poor health outcomes are 
often exacerbated in disabled populations, where disabled populations are often at greater risk of 
secondary diseases and have poorer overall mental and physical health even when they are food 
secure (Brucker, 2017; Musumeci, 2014; Pumkam et al., 2013; Schwatz et al., 2019). 
Higher rates of food insecurity are persistent amongst individuals with disabilities, who are 
also more likely to be very-food insecure (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013a). In 2009, about 25% 
of the disabled population reported being food insecure, including 11.8% that was very-food 
insecure, this was double the rate of food insecurity amongst households without an individual 
with a disability in the United States (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013a). 
 Research suggests that households with an individual with a disability often experience 
greater expenses, while having lower incomes, thus making these households more susceptible to 
food insecurity (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013a). Due to increased expenses, people with a 
disability require two to three times the income to be food secure compared to someone without a 
disability (Coleman-Jensen and Nord, 2013b; Schwatz et al., 2019). Mobility and food access are 
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strongly associated with food security amongst the disabled population, but the effects of social 
capital and urban versus rural living and type of disability create great variability in these results 
(Schwatz et al., 2019).  Collectively these likely explain part of food insecurity amongst this 
population, but given the variety of types of disability and differentiation in how disability is 
measured, there are significant limitations in comparisons between research results challenging 
(Gunderson and Ziliak, 2018).  
Medicaid Expansion  
The overall goals of the ACA were to increase health care coverage, access to care, and 
usage of preventative care (Cawley, Soni, and Simon, 2018). Expanding Medicaid helps to achieve 
the goals of the ACA by addressing the insurance gap that impacts many very low-income 
individuals who are unemployed or otherwise do not receive health insurance through their 
employer. Because people with a disability face higher rates of under or unemployment many 
report having difficulty accessing sufficient health care, and spend significantly more and a larger 
percentage of their household income on out of pocket expenses for health care (Coleman-Jensen 
and Nord, 2013a; Kennedy, Geneva Wood, and Frieden, 2017). People with disabilities are far 
more likely to rely on public insurance due to challenges that many people with a disability face, 
such as gaining employment and accessing privatized insurance that sufficiently covers their health 
care needs (Kennedy et al., 2017). 
Prior to the passage of the ACA, individuals with a disability had four primary pathways 
through which they could access Medicaid: 1) the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pathway, 
2) the medically needy pathway, 3) the buy-in program, and 4) the blind and disabled pathway. 
The only pathway mandated at the federal level was the SSI pathway, and all other pathways were 
optional for states.  The SSI pathway covers individuals who qualify for SSI, those who previously 
qualified for SSI but have earnings making them no longer eligible, or those who lost eligibility 
for SSI that are over 18 but had a disability prior to age 22 (MACPAC, 2017). The SSI pathway 
in most states has an income limit set at the 74% of the FPL. Even within the federally mandated 
SSI pathway there are some state level variations in how the pathway is implemented. There are 
eight states that elected the 209(b) option for Medicaid through the SSI pathway, which allows 
states to be more restrictive than the current qualifications for SSI, but no more restrictive than the 
SSI requirements in 1972 when the SSI program was originally implemented (Musumeci et al., 
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2019). Additionally, 41 states and the District of Columbia allow for automatic enrollment in 
Medicaid if determined eligible for SSI (Rupp and Riley, 2016).  
To meet the disability requirements through SSI an individual may not have substantial 
gainful activity, and either has a mental or physical impairment that is expected to result in death 
or has/will last(ed) 12 months (Social Security Administration, 2019). The SSI pathway has an 
income limit of 74% of the FPL. While SSI is the main pathway that individuals with disabilities 
access Medicaid, Medicaid expansion increased the income eligibility limit, and allowed 
individuals with a disability who did not previously meet the requirements of SSI disability 
(Musumeci and Orgera, 2020). 
The remaining three pathways, the medically needy pathway, the buy-in program, and the 
blind and disabled pathway are optional and give states flexibility to set qualification requirements 
limiting the assets and income of households that are eligible to qualify for Medicaid through each 
pathway. The medically needy pathway provides the option for states to cover individuals with 
high medical expenses, the income restrictions through this pathway are often less than the income 
limit set for SSI (Musumeci et al., 2019).  The buy-in pathway allow individuals that are working 
disabled to buy into the Medicaid program with subsidized rates based upon income (MACPAC, 
2017). Seniors and people with disabilities pathway allow states to cover persons with a disability 
with incomes up to 100% of the FPL, which increases the income limit of SSI which is 74% of the 
FPL (Musumeci et al., 2019). Each state’s income and asset restrictions for the varying pathways 
in which persons with a disability access Medicaid are outlined in Table 1. 
Eligibility through the Medicaid expansion pathway created by the ACA is primarily based 
on having an income of less than 138% of the FPL. Prior research has shown Medicaid expansion 
led to an increase in insurance enrollment, health care access, and the use of preventative care 
(Cawley et al., 2018; Sommers and Epstein, 2010). From 2013 to 2015 Medicaid insurance 
enrollment grew from 7.2 million to 8.4 million for working-age adults with disabilities, 
additionally fewer people with disabilities reported difficulty in accessing health care (Kennedy et 
al., 2017). Beyond increased health care usage and access, Medicaid expansion has also provided 
additional benefits to low-income households that qualified for this program, including increased 
financial stability and decreased food insecurity rates (Courtemanche, Denteh, and Tchernis, 2019; 
Himmelstein, 2019; Londhe and Schlesinger, 2019; Moellman, 2018). Medicaid expansion in 
counties that experience the highest level of uptake experience the greatest degree also have the 
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most significant decrease in food insecurity (Londhe and Schlesinger, 2019). Additional research 
suggests that households that participate in SNAP and meet Medicaid requirements under 
expansion requirements, experienced a greater percentage decrease in food security if they lived 
in an expansion state than households than those that did not live in expansion states (Moellman, 
2018). This suggests that SNAP and Medicaid complement each other (Moellman, 2018). 
Collectively the reviewed studies show how social programs such as Medicaid indirectly impact 
rates of food insecurity. This research suggests that Medicaid expansion could both increase uptake 
in insured rates among the population of interest and allow household income to be reallocated 
from healthcare expenditures to food and other household goods. 
While there is substantial research in areas of food insecurity and barriers to food access 
for those that are disabled, there are limitations in the literature for investigations of how non-food 
policies impact food security and the relationship of disability to food security. The previous 
literature review on food insecurity, increased vulnerability of those that are disabled, and poor 
health outcomes suggest that increasing access to health care would impact low-income 
households that include someone with a disability. Gaining a greater understanding of Medicaid 
expansion’s impact on food insecurity on households with an individual with a disability could 
offer insights into the reciprocal relationship between health care access and food security amongst 
this population. This would provide a more robust understanding of the heterogenous impact of 
the Medicaid expansion program on qualifying populations.  
Policy Evaluation 
The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that increased access to subsidized health care 
through Medicaid improves household food security by decreasing household medical 
expenditures. A basic consumer demand model (Figure 1) can be used to demonstrate how 
receiving Medicaid could result in an improvement in food security. Receiving Medicaid decreases 
the amount households with a disability spend on medical goods and services, not graphed. This 
increases the amount of remaining income they have to spend on other household goods and food, 
which causes the budget constraint to shift in Figure 1 from line A to line C. Given and equal share 
of the expanded budget, this would shift consumption of food and other household goods from (F0, 
G0) to (F1, G1) (Moellman, 2018, p. 41). An increased household budget is expected to increase in 
food insecure households, making households more food secure. 
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However, given that food insecurity is often linked to poverty, other good purchases may 
have been limited among households that experienced food insecurity. Because of this, consumers 
may use the increased budget to purchase other household goods rather than food. This would be 
captured at a point (F0, G2) where there is no increase in food purchases and a more significant 
increase in expenditures on other household goods compared to the movement to (F1, G1) 
(Moellman, 2018). Additionally, while Medicaid expansion is intended to reach low income 
households many individuals who qualify for Medicaid choose not to enroll, or face additional 
barriers to access the program that vary across states (Kennedy et al., 2017). The empirical analysis 
will provide an understanding of the change expenditures resulting from the expected new budget 
allocation.  
The effect of a policy or program on a household’s outcomes is known as the treatment 
effect. To measure the household’s treatment effect for Medicaid it would be necessary to observe 
a household’s food security status when they receive Medicaid, and simultaneously do not receive 
Medicaid. This individual measurement is not feasible, as a single observation cannot 
simultaneously receive Medicaid and not receive Medicaid, making the absence of receiving 
Medicaid, the counterfactual, an unobservable outcome (Morgan and Winship, 2015). Since the 
household’s treatment effect is not measurable, the impact of Medicaid enrollment must be 
measured as the difference between the average outcome for groups of households based on their 
participation in Medicaid which is known as the average treatment effect (ATE). In our specific 
example, the Medicaid ATE would be measured as the difference in the average food security 
status for households participating in Medicaid less the average food security status for households 
not participating in Medicaid.  
A major challenge when trying to estimate the relationship between Medicaid and food 
insecurity comes from the voluntary nature of Medicaid participation. This voluntary participation 
can result in a sample selection bias if households that choose to participate in Medicaid are also 
more or less likely to be food insecure due to unobservable or unmeasurable household 
characteristics, such as having poorer health.  Creating a randomized control trial (RCT) would 
minimize the bias by randomly assigning individuals to either receive or not receive Medicaid (i.e. 
randomly assign both treatment and control groups) allowing both measurable and unmeasurable 
covariates to be balanced amongst the two groups.  However, the effects of Medicaid are generally 
estimated using natural experiments due to ethical and practical concerns of randomly assigning 
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household units to Medicaid (Allen et al., 2017; Cawley et al., 2018; Moellman, 2018). Medicaid 
expansion created as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides a natural experiment that 
can be utilized to study the effects of increased access to Medicaid on household outcomes.  
Medicaid expansion was enacted at the state level beginning in 2014, and it created a 
natural experiment because expansion did not occur in all states and an individual household could 
not choose if their state expanded Medicaid. This moves the treatment group assignment to the 
state level instead of the household. The household can now only fall into a treated group if the 
state selected to participate in Medicaid expansion, which makes the assignment to a treatment 
group exogenous from the perspective of the household. Thus, the natural experiment can be used 
to address the selection bias created by voluntary participation in Medicaid. 
A natural experiment is created by the immediate effect of the change in state policy, 
allowing for the Medicaid evaluated using a difference-in-difference model (DD). In the classic 
DD model, if expansion had occurred only in a single period, there are two time periods (pre and 
post) and two groups (treatment and comparison) shown in Figure 2. The DD model predicts the 
counterfactual based upon linear trends, assuming that both expansion states and non-expansion 
states follow a similar trend in the outcome variable pre-treatment (prior to T=0) and resumes a 
similar trend post treatment (after T=0). Then the difference in the outcome and expected 
counterfactual represents the treatment effect which is estimated by comparing the difference 
across time in the treatment group (Medicaid expansion states) to the difference across time in the 
comparison group (non-expansion states) (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
In a linear regression DD analysis a dummy variable are added to represent time, as either 
pre-expansion or post-expansion noted as subscript t , and another for the group of each 
observation, as either expansion states or non-expansion states for each observation i, and an 
interaction term that captures the treatment effect represented as 𝛽3 in Equation [1] (Goodman-
Bacon, 2019). 
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝜀𝑡𝑖 (1) 
The treatment effect captured in the DD model allows for treatment to only occur in a 
single time-period. When there are multiple treatment times the traditional DD model is adapted 
by using time and state fixed effects, called the fixed effect difference-in-difference model (FE-
DD) (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This is a frequent occurrence in state level policy analysis when 
states choose to adopt or implement the same policy in different time periods.  
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Similar to the classic DD model, the goal of the FE-DD model is to estimate the average 
treatment effect, but there is no longer a single pre- and post- period. Instead, time and group 
effects are controlled for using a series of time and state fixed effects. The FE-DD model is 
represented by the Equation [2] below where 𝛼𝑖 are the state cross-sectional dummies and 𝛼𝑡 are 
time dummies  and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the treatment dummy (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). The state cross-sectional 
fixed effect will measure the differences amongst states that remains constant over time. The time 
fixed effect measures differences across time but remain constant across all states. The treatment 
dummy, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 , takes a value of 1 in states that have expanded Medicaid after the expansion occurs 
in time t and is 0 otherwise. 
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
While the use of the FE- DD model to estimate the ATE in cases where there is variation 
in the timing of treatment is common, there is no straight forward interpretation of the treatment 
effect. Unlike in the classic DD model where the treatment effect is measured as the average 
difference across time between two groups, the FE-DD model has multiple groups that are 
compared over multiple time periods. Goodman-Bacon (2019) suggests that the estimated value 
(𝛽𝐷𝐷 ) from the FE-DD regression cannot be explained as simply as the classic DD model, which 
he refers to as the 2x2 DD model. Rather, his decomposition theorem shows how the 𝛽𝐷𝐷  , the 
overall treatment effect, is the weighted average of all possible 2X2 DD treatment effects. 
Decomposition is not only significant for interpreting the treatment effect, but it also identifies 
possible sources of bias in the estimated treatment effect. Importantly Goodman-Bacon (2019) 
shows that if the 2x2 DD treatment effects vary over time, it will bias the overall FE-DD treatment 
effect. 
Similar to the 2x2 DD model, the decomposition also shows that the FE-DD model requires 
a different assumption regarding pre-treatment trends. Unlike the 2x2 DD model, which requires 
pre-treatment trends to be parallel in the treatment and comparison groups, the FE-DD requires the 
variance weight common trends (VWCT) to be zero (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). The VWCT 
compares the variance in trends across each of the 2x2 DD estimators. 
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Figure 3 provides an illustration of how the FE-DD and Goodman-Bacon decomposition 
apply to the Medicaid expansion experiment, where the effect of the state policy occurs in shocks 
in each year, 𝑡2014, 𝑡2015, 𝑡2016, in which a state or group of states enact Medicaid expansion. 
These expansion groups are outlined in Table 1. The policy shock shifts the food insecurity rates 
of each of the expansion groups. The decomposition theory breaks this large experiment into 
smaller experiments. Each smaller experiment is a 2x2 comparison between expansion groups and 
year. For the Medicaid example there are nine 2x2 comparisons made, represented in Figure 4. A 
MID treatment period is created between expansion periods where expansion groups act as a 
comparison group when they are not receiving treatment (Goodman-Bacon, 2019).  
The decomposition of Medicaid expansion’s impact on food insecurity can be described 
using each of in the 2x2 DD seen in Figure 4, which are also captured in Equations [3-5]. These 
equations compare each group by the year in which they expand Medicaid as well as to the group 
of states that did not expand Medicaid (i.e. compares 2014 expansion group to 2015 expansion 
group). The estimated  ?̂?2𝑥2 is the ATE of Medicaid expansion on the household’s food insecurity 
for each 2x2 DD. The treatment groups are defined in the subscripts, k represents the states that 
opted to expand early relative to the comparison group, l represents the states that expanded 
Medicaid late relative to the comparison group, and u represents the states that did not expand 
Medicaid during the time observed, when there are more treatment periods additional pairwise 
comparisons are added to compare each of the treatment groups to each other as well as to the 
untreated group. 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the outcome variable at each time-period measuring the change in 
household food security score or share of households that are very food insecure. The super script 
denotes the time relative to the treatment in each treatment group where mid(k, l) represents the 
time after treatment occurred for the early treatment group but before treatment occurs for the late 
treatment group (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). Thus, equation [3] is the comparison between treated 
and untreated groups and represented by (I-III) in Figure 4. Equation [4] compares the early 
treatment groups to the later treatment groups that act as a control and are represented by (IV-VI) 
 ?̂?𝑘𝑢
2𝑥2 = (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
− 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘
𝑝𝑟𝑒
) − (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑢
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡




2𝑥2 = (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑑 − 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘
𝑝𝑟𝑒
) − (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑙
𝑚𝑖𝑑 − 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑒
)  (4) 
 ?̂?𝑘𝑙
2𝑥2 = (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
− 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑙
𝑚𝑖𝑑) − (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑘
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡




in Figure 4. Equation [5] compares the late treatment group to the earlier treatment groups that as 
a control and represented by (VII-IX) in Figure 4. 
The weighted sum of equations [3-5] is equal to the overall ATE, which is 𝛽𝐷𝐷 in Equation 
[2] (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). 
 𝛽
𝐷𝐷 = ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑢?̂?𝑘𝑢


































The  formula for the weights  𝑠𝑘𝑢 and 𝑠𝑘𝑙 in Equation [6] are given in Equations [7-9], where 
?̂?𝐷 is the variance of the overall treatment dummy, ?̅?𝑘 is the share of time that each treatment 
group spends in treatment, and 𝑛𝑘 is the sample share in each group (Goodman-Bacon, 2019).  
Weights are distributed to each of the 2x2 summing to a total of 1. The weights vary by where the 
data falls within the panel with the middle sub-samples receiving the largest weights, allowing the 
researcher to manipulate how weights are distributed for the overall estimate (Goodman-Bacon, 
2019). The other portion of weight comes from the size of the group within the panel, with the 
largest amount of weight is distributed to the groups that are largest (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). 
Including demographic or other covariates introduces additional sources of variation in the 
model that will influence the 𝛽𝐷𝐷 estimate. In the treatment effect decomposition, this is described 
as the “within” component this is caused by the estimate being conditioned on covariates which 
changes the estimate due to variation from the covariates at the observational level (Goodman-
Bacon, 2019).  The linear regression equation outlining the FE-DD with covariates is shown in 
Equation [10].  
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 +Φ𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 (10) 
 𝛽
𝐷𝐷 = 𝛺?̂?𝑤







Where 𝑋𝑠𝑡 represents all other variables included in the model and 𝛽
𝐷𝐷 is conditional upon 
the added covariates. Equation 11 shows the decomposition of the covariate model with additional 
𝑠𝑘𝑢 =
(𝑛𝑘+𝑛𝑢)












𝑘  is the estimate of the 2x2s of each estimate conditional on added covariates. 
The FE-DD model will allow for the inclusion of multiple Medicaid expansion periods into 
the natural experiment. The decomposition will provide more interpretability of the 𝛽𝐷𝐷 estimate 
in the FE-DD model, and for greater confidence that the estimate is unbiased by time variation of 
the treatment as it shows where variation the estimate occurs as well as how the overall estimate 
is weighted. This analysis will provide an important contribution to current literature on policy 







This project used data from the December 2011-2018 Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which included the Food Security Supplement (FSS). The CPS is produced by the United States 
(US) Census Bureau and United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which samples households from 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia (Chao et al., 2006). Data from the CPS and FSS was 
accessed and harmonized through IPUMS USA (Flood et al., 2020).  
The population of interest is households that were eligible for the Medicaid expansion 
pathway and include at least one member with a disability. To be included in the sample set, 
households were required to meet the following inclusion criteria: a person between the ages 18-
65 with a recorded disability, not in the armed forces or an institution, is a US citizen, and the 
family income must be equal to or less than 150% of the FPL.  Households that did not respond to 
the food security survey are also excluded. The final sample included 13,142 households across 
all eight years of data. There were 1,755 households in 2011, 1,844 households in 2012, 1,650 
households in 2013, 1,914 households in 2014, 1,696 households in 2015, 1,636 households in 
2016, 1,415 households in 2017, and 1,232 households in 2018.  
Household’s disability status was determined using the self-reported disability status of 
each adult in each household. Each adult in the household was asked a series of Yes/No questions 
to determine if they had difficulty with or have the following disabilities: deaf or hearing, blind or 
seeing, remembering, walking, dressing or bathing, and running errands. An affirmative response 
to any of these questions indicated the individual has a self-reported disability. Individual-level 
disability status was determined by a dummy variable that equals one if that observation answered 
affirmatively to any of the disability questions. Household-level disability status was determined 
by summing across responses from all adults in the households. If household disability was equal 
to zero, the household was excluded from the sample set. 
 All outcome variables were created from the household’s food security score, which was 
calculated from affirmative responses to questions in the Current Food Security Module (CFSM). 
In order to reduce respondent burden the first two questions of the FSS survey screened 
respondents preventing individuals likely to be highly food secure from having to take the full 
food security module. Households that had incomes exceeding 185% of the FPL and did not 
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affirmatively answer the least severe food insecurity condition, are assumed to be food secure and 
are assigned a food security score of 0. All other households that pass the screener were asked the 
remaining questions in the survey. 
 Households can score between 0-18, with higher scores indicating the household is less 
food secure.  A household is defined as food insecure if they answer three or more questions 
affirmatively and very food insecure if a household without children responds affirmatively to 6 
or more questions or 8 or more if the household has children (Flood et al., 2020). As the survey 
progresses, the food security questions are designed to capture household behavior that reflects 
increasing food insecurity severity. The lowest severity question is, “Which of these statements 
best describes the food eaten in your household-- enough of the kinds of food (I/ we) want to eat, 
enough but not always the kinds of food (I/ we) want to eat, sometimes not enough to eat, or often 
not enough to eat?” and the most severe question for households without children is “In the last 12 
months, did (you/you or other adults in your household) ever not eat for a whole day because there 
wasn't enough money for food? (Yes/No)” and with children, the most severe condition is “In the 
last 12 months, did (the child/any of the children) ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn't 
enough money for food? (Yes/No)” (Bureau of the Census, 2018).  The food security score, and 
was used to create two outcome variables of interest. The first was the total household score, the 
second was an indicator variable for very-low food security outcome. These were aggregated to 
the state year level by taking the average of all households within each state year. 
Household income was determined using the family income reported by the head of the 
household and is recorded as a bracketed value (i.e., income between $0 and $25,000). To convert 
household income to a percentage of the FPL the highest possible value in each bracket is used as 
the income. The FPL is determined annually and is based on the number of people within the 
family. Five household income dummy variables were created based on range values relative to 
the FPL: income ≤50% FPL, income 50% FPL< x ≤100% FPL, income 100% FPL< x ≤130% FPL 
income 130% FPL< x ≤150% FPL and with income >150% FPL. Households with incomes that 
exceed 150% FPL are excluded from the sample set. 
Additional covariates capture household and state characteristics Individual-level data is 
aggregated to the state level including sex, race, ethnicity, education level, age, employment status, 
number of children, household size, residing in a metropolitan area, and whether the household 
participates in SNAP are aggregated to the state level based upon the head of the household’s 
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response. This is done by finding the state year average of respondents for each of the variables. 
The republican power variable was created by giving binary points for republican legislative power 
and governor republican power and summing them together for each year, holding a maximum 
value of 2 per year and a minimum of 0 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2021). These 
variates are essentail for predicting enrollment in and food insecurity, and thus are included in 
models to isolate the treatment effect and minimize omitted-variable bias. 
Analysis  
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all covariates and outcome variables and are 
separately calculated for Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. Joint p-values are used to 
determine if there are statistically significant differences between the Medicaid expansion and non-
expansion states.  
The effect of Medicaid expansion on state level food insecurity amongst households that 
include an individual with a disability is estimated using a linear FE-DD, and the Bacon-Goodman 
decomposition is used to interpret the results. The FE-DD model and decomposition were 
estimated in STATA version 16.  
Fixed effects are included in the model to capture unobserved heterogeneity in state and 
time. State fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) are dummy variables for each of the 50 states and DC, and captures 
differences in food security across states that are constant over time. Time fixed effects (𝛼𝑡) 
includes 8 dummy variables for the years 2011-2018 that captures variation in each year that is 
constant across all states. The treatment dummy variable was created to indicate the year in which 
a state implemented Medicaid expansion (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡). For each state and year, the treatment 
variable takes a value of 1 for all years following states’ implementation of Medicaid and is 0 
otherwise (ie. California implemented Medicaid expansion in 2014, so from 2011-2013 the 
treatment variable is 0 and from 2014-2018 it is 1). Table 1 shows which states expanded Medicaid 
and the time that the policy was implemented. Models with (Equation 13) and without (Equation 
12) demographic covariates were estimated.   
The FE-DD decomposition was completed using the command bacondecomp 
(Goodman-Bacon, Goldring, and Nichols, 2019). This code calculates the weights and treatment 
effect estimates for each 2x2 DD. Additionally, bacondecomp produces a graphical summary 
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 (12) 
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + Φ𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 (13) 
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of each of the 2x2 DD weights and FE-DD estimates. Equations [3-5] illustrate the decomposition 
of the overall treatment effect, described in Equation [6], for the Medicaid expansion into the nine 
2X2 DD, where there are three treatment timing groups of states that expand Medicaid in 2014, 
2015, and 2016, and a group of states that did not expand Medicaid.  
For this model to produce an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, there are several 
assumptions that must hold. The first assumption is the variance weighted common trends 
(VWCT), which is similar to the parallel trends assumption from the basic DD model.  The VWCT 
assumption is that the variance weighted of food insecurity trends amongst states that expanded 
Medicaid in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and did not expand should be zero, or there should be no 
significant difference between the variance weighted trends of the counterfactuals amongst each 
of the treated groups (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). The VWCT assumption is tested using a 
reweighted balance t-test from an OLS regression of the time average of a covariate on the 
weighted treatment effect indicator shown in Equation [14], requiring  𝛽1 = 0 (Goodman-Bacon, 
2019).   
The dependent variable is the time average of the prevalence of households with an income 
between 50% FPL and 100% FPL in each timing-treatment group. This covariate acts as a proxy, 
which is a covariate for food security and is variant over time. The only independent variable 
included in this regression is a weighted effective treatment indicator (𝐵𝑘 × 𝑤𝑘). Because each 
treatment timing group serves as both a treatment and comparison group in the FE-DD, the 
effective treatment indicator, 𝐵𝑘, assigns only groups that receive relatively greater weight when 
acting as a treatment group (𝑤𝑡) as compared to a control group (𝑤𝑐) to the effective treatment 
group (i.e. 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑐 > 0). Then, the effective treatment indicator, 𝐵𝑘, is weighted by the difference 
in weights [15]. The weights for each of the 𝛽𝐷𝐷 were calculated using equations [7-9].  
The other assumption is that the average treatment effect does not change over time. We 
use the shorthand ∆ATT to refer to this assumption.  This ∆ATT assumption is tested using an 
 𝐻𝐻 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝐵𝑘 × 𝑤𝑘) + 𝑒 (14) 
 𝑤𝑘=𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑐 (15) 
 
𝐵𝑘 = 1 when 𝑤𝑡−𝑤𝑐 > 0 




event study. An event study predicts the difference in the outcome variable over time (Equation 
17) (Sun and Abraham, 2020).  
 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜇ℓ1{𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠 = ℓ}+𝜀𝑠𝑡 (17) 
Event studies recenters the treatment period, so that for all years that expansion occurs 
(2014, 2015, 2016) the treatment occurs at ̟ ℓ ؘ =0.  For 𝜇ℓ measures the average treatment effect at 
periods ℓ. 𝐸𝑠 is the year that treatment occurs for state s (Sun and Abraham, 2020). For the event 
study to show that this assumption holds there would be a change in household food security status 
at ℓ =0, when treatment occurs, in all other periods, there should be no statistically significant 





RESULTS and CONCLUSION 
Results 
 Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics and tests for differences in average values 
across the Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. Both outcome variables, average 
household food security score (non-expansion=3.69, expansion=3.56, p-value=0.11) and 
prevalence of low food security (non-expansion=0.28, expansion 0.26 p-value=0.09), had 
statistical similar means in the non-expansion and expansion states at the 95% CI. The average 
age is 49.42 and 49.48 in non-expansion and expansion states, respectively. The prevalence of 
female heads of household is 0.58 in both expansion and non-expansion states. The prevalence of 
black heads of household is 0.21 and 0.17 in non-expansion and expansion states, respectively. 
The prevalence of heads of households that are Hispanic is 0.06 and 0.10 in non-expansion and 
expansion states, respectively. The prevalence of head of households unemployed is 0.05 in both 
non-expansion and expansion states. The prevalence of households participating in SNAP is 0.46 
and 0.48 in non-expansion and expansion states, respectively.  The average number of children is 
0.67 and 0.65 in non-expansion and expansion states, respectively. The average family size is 
2.29 and 2.21 in non-expansion and expansion states, respectively. The prevalence of heads of 
household receiving less than a high-school degree are 0.25 in both non-expansion and 
expansion states. The average state republican control is 1.78 and 0.80 in non-expansion and 
expansion states, respectively. Several covariates were similar amongst the treated and untreated 
groups, but marital status (p-value=0.00), Hispanic (p-value=0.00), metropolitan area (p-
value=0.00), family size (p-value=0.02), and republican state control (p-value=0.00), had 
statistically significant difference between their means at the 95% CI. Additionally, the average 
household food security score variable is reported graphically over time to reflect how household 
food security scores changed in the years from 2011-2018 in each of the treatment groups. This 
is shown in Figure 5, showing that the trends amongst expansion groups and non-expansion 
states are relatively similar across time. 
Results from the FE-DD without demographic and state government covariates are 
reported in Table 3. The first column contains results for the model that used the state average 
household food security score as the outcome, and it shows the treatment effect was negative but 
not statistically significant (coef=-0.06, pval=0.70). The prevalence of very food insecure 
21 
 
households is reported in the second column and was also negative but statistically insignificant 
(coef=-0.02; pval= 0.39).  The decomposition results for the average variable household food 
security score is reported in Table 4 with the break-down of the treatment effect estimate into each 
2x2 sub-experiment between treated and untreated groups and treated and other treated groups, as 
well as how the weights are distributed for each 2x2. Majority of the weight, 74%, of the treatment 
effect estimate comes from the 2x2 with the 2014 treatment timing group compared to the 
untreated group, and the treated to untreated 2x2s carry 84% of the weight. This weight distribution 
is because most states expanded Medicaid in 2014, and 2014 fell in the middle of the panel. The 
estimate and weights for the groups of comparisons for both outcome variables are recorded in 
Table 5. Figure 5 shows each of the 2x2s with their respective weights on the x-axis and the 
estimates on the y-axis.  
The following two models included covariates to control for state level variation that could 
impact the state food security score. These are included to isolate the treatment effect from other 
state level variation. After including covariates in the model to the ATE estimate with the outcome 
variable household food security score became positive but statistically insignificant (coef= 0.03; 
pvalue= 0.83). The results are reported in column 1 of Table 6. These results are decomposed by 
the treatment group and reported in part A of Table 7. The variation coming from the covariates 
(coef=2.13; weight=0.04), the variation from between the treatment groups (coef= -0.30; 
weight=0.13), the variation that comes from between the treated and untreated group is (coef= -
0.01; weight= 0.83). The same covariates were included with the outcome variable share of very 
food insecure with the overall estimate (coef= -0.01; pvalue=0.69). The complete results are 
reported in column 2 of Table 6. The decomposition results are reported by the variation in part B 
of Table 7.  The variation coming from the covariates (coef=0.22; weight=0.04), the variation from 
between the treatment groups (coef=-0.05; weight=0.13), the variation that comes from between 
the treated and untreated group is (coef=-0.01; weight= 0.83). 
Following the regression, two tests were performed to indicate whether the VWCT and 
∆ATT assumptions hold so that FE-DD can be interpreted as the variance weighted treatment 
effect. The VWCT was completed on models including no demographic or state covariates, and 
the outcome variable household food security score. The results from the VWCT test are reported 
in Table 8. The VWCT assumption held, the weighted variance of the trends was not statistically 
different (VWCT=0). The ∆ATT was tested using an event study. This was repeated on each of 
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the four models shown in Figure 7 and Figure 9. The event studies suggest that there is no 
significant change in the treatment effect over time. This is indicated by the confidence intervals 
passing through zero at each time-period on the graph. This suggests that regardless of year pre or 
post treatment, there is no statistical difference in the food security score or the very-food insecure 
outcome variables. Additionally, the event study allows the ∆ATT assumption to hold for each of 
the models. 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between access to health 
insurance and food security amongst households with a disability. This study utilized the 
expansion of Medicaid that resulted from the passage of the ACA as a natural experiment to 
investigate this relationship. Our results suggest that access to health insurance may not be 
sufficient to improve households’ food security with a disability. This finding is similar to 
Moellman (2018) who found that Medicaid expansion was only statistically significant 
improvement in food security status amongst households that also participated in SNAP. 
Despite having statistically insignificant results, the decomposition provided additional 
information about the estimate from the FE-DD. The decomposition showed that the treatment 
effect estimate is not only driven by comparing the treated to untreated groups but also from 
comparisons between the treatment groups. This allows for more understanding of the treatment 
effect produced in the FE-DD estimate. The primary comparison that drove the estimate was the 
2014 to the untreated group in each of the models. Adding covariates to the FE-DD additional 
variation comes from the covariates within the expansion states. This was a large source of 
variation with the covariate models. 
These results imply that increased access to health care through Medicaid expansion may 
not be sufficient to decrease household food security status for households that include an adult 
with a disability. There are several limitations to this analysis, the first is heterogeneity in 
treatment. Because some states had more inclusive pre-expansion policies for individuals with 
disabilities to access Medicaid, the treatment effect may vary across states even within the same 
treatment period. This was not controlled for in this analysis. This may have significant 
implications for states that have yet to expand Medicaid, with many holding relatively more 
stringent Medicaid income and asset requirements. The treatment effect may additionally be 
heterogenous based on the type of disability, because SSI has disability requirements that have to 
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be met to receive Medicaid through this pathway many people who identify a disability do not 
meet these requirements (Musumeci and Orgera, 2020). Medicaid expansion allows for individuals 
with a disability that previously were not meeting these criteria to gain access to Medicaid, but this 
would likely vary across types of disability. Because this study did not measure the change in 
enrollment status, we may have created too broad of inclusion criteria, including more individuals 
that qualified for Medicaid prior to expansion. To address some of these issues, future research 
could attempt to measure the heterogeneity from the state policies by attempting to measure the 
change in enrollment status instead of just change in access. Additionally, the possible 
heterogeneity amongst the type of disability could be addressed using a triple difference model, 
repeated for each disability type.  
Other key limitations to this analysis and were not controlled for were the share of 
households that participate in other social programs including SSI and SNAP. While both of these 
programs are likely to have significant impacts on household food security status, SNAP is a 
known endogenous variable and there were data limitations to knowing which households 
participated in SSI. While SNAP was not included in the model from the review of the data 
demonstrates that the mean share of households participating in SNAP was similar amongst treated 
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Table 1. Medicaid Requirements by State and Medicaid Expansion Date 
  





























Alabama No - - - - - - - 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Alaska Yes 9/1/2015 - - - 3163 10000 100 FPL 9000 74 2000 No No 
Arizona Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 2530 None 50 FPL 12144 100 None No Yes 
Arkansas Yes 1/1/2014 108 11 3000 - - - 9648 80 7560 No Yes 
California Yes 1/1/2014 600 59 3000 2530 2000 0 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
Colorado Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 4553 None 41 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Connecticut Yes 1/1/2014 523 52 2400 3082.5 10000 200 FPL 6276 63 1600 Yes No 
Delaware Yes 1/1/2014 652 64 6000 2782 None 100 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
DC Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 3036 None None 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Florida No - 180 18 6000 2024 5000 None 10692 88 5000 No Yes 
Georgia No - 317 32 4000 3036 4000 150 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Hawaii Yes 1/1/2014 469 40 3000 - - - 13968 100 2000 Yes No 
Idaho Yes 1/1/2020 - - - 5080 10000 133 FPL 9636 80 2000 No No 
Illinois Yes 1/1/2014 1012 100 3000 3433 25000 25 FPL 12144 100 2000 Yes No 
Indiana Yes 2/1/2015 - - - 2024 2000 150 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
Iowa Yes 1/1/2014 483 48 10000 2530 12000 > 150 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Kansas No - 475 47 3000 3035 15000 100 FPL 9000 74 2000 No No 
Kentucky Yes 1/1/2014 235 24 4000 2530 5000 None 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Louisiana Yes 7/1/2016 100 10 3000 1012 10000 None 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Maine Yes 1/10/2019 315 32 3000 2530 8000 $10-$20 12144 100 2000 No Yes 




Table 1. Continued 





























Massachusetts Yes 1/1/2014 522 52 3000 None None >150 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
Michigan Yes 4/1/2014 1012 100 3000 2023 4000 None 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
Minnesota Yes 1/1/2014 810 80 6000 None 20000 0 FPL 12144 100 3000 Yes No 
Mississippi No - - - - 2530 24000 150 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Missouri No - - - - - - - 10560 87 3000 Yes No 
Montana Yes 1/1/2016 525 52 3000 2530 15000 100 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Nebraska Yes TBD 392 39 6000 2530 4000 200 FPL 12144 100 4000 No No 
Nevada Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 2529 15000 0 FPL 9000 74 2000 No No 
New 
Hampshire 
Yes 8/15/2014 591 58 4000 2530 28568 150 FPL 9000 74 1500 Yes No 
New Jersey Yes 1/1/2014 367 37 6000 2530 20000 150 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
New Mexico Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 1519 1000 None 9000 74 2000 No Yes    





242 24 3000 2024 2000 150 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 
North Dakota Yes 1/1/2014 840 83 6000 2277 13000 225FPL 9000 74 3000 Yes No 
Ohio Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 2530 11901 150 FPL 9000 74 2000 No No 
Oklahoma No - - - - - - - 12144 100 2000 No No 
Oregon Yes 1/1/2014 - - - 2530 5000 75 FPL 9000 74 2000 No No 
Pennsylvania Yes 1/1/2015 425 42 3200 2530 10000 0 FPL 12144 100 2000 No Yes 




- - - - - - - 
12144 100 7560 No Yes 
South Dakota No - - - - 2530 8000 None 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Tennessee No - 241 24 3000 - - - 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Texas No - 104 11 3000 2530 5000 150 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Utah Yes 1/1/2020 1012 100 3000 2529 15000 100 FPL 12144 100 2000 No No 
Vermont Yes 1/1/2014 1041 110 3000 2530 10000 None 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
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Table 1. Continued 





























Virginia Yes 1/1/2019 493 49 3000 810 2000 None 9720 81 2000 Yes No 
Washington Yes 1/1/2014 750 75 3000 2226 None 6.5 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
West Virginia Yes 1/1/2014 200 20 3000 2530 2000 0 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
Wisconsin No - 592 59 3000 2529 15000 150 FPL 10005 83 2000 No Yes 
Wyoming No - - - - 2250  None 0 FPL 9000 74 2000 No Yes 
(Rupp and Riley, 2016; The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018, 2019a, 2019c, 2019b, 2020)  
33 
 
Table 2. State Level Summary Statistics for Medicaid Expansion States and Non-




 Medicaid Expansion 
Raw Food Security Score 3.69  3.56 
 (0.77) 
 (0.82) 
State Very Food Insecure 0.28*  0.26* 
 (0.08)  (0.10) 
State Under FPL (%) 0.63**  0.63** 
 (0.10)  (0.11) 
State Average Age 49.42  49.48 
 (2.35)  (2.43) 
State Female (%) 0.58  0.58 
 (0.09)  (0.09) 
State Married (%) 0.27***  0.23*** 
 (0.09)  (0.09) 
State Black (%) 0.21*  0.17* 
 (0.17)  (0.20) 
State Hispanic (%) 0.06***  0.10*** 
 (0.08)  (0.13) 
State Unemployed (%) 0.05  0.05 
 (0.05)  (0.04) 
State SNAP Participation (%) 0.46*  0.48* 
 (0.13)  (0.12) 
State Metropolitan (%) 0.24***  0.31*** 
 (0.18)  (0.23) 
State Average Number Children 0.67  0.65 
 (0.21)  (0.20) 
State Average Family Size 2.29***  2.21*** 
 (0.31)  (0.35) 
State Less Than High School Degree (%) 0.25  0.25 
 (0.10)  (0.10) 
Republican State Control 1.78***  0.8*** 
 (0.41)  (0.82) 
Note: SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, reporting means (standard deviation)  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Fixed Effect Difference in Difference Model Results Measuring the Impact of 
Medicaid Expansion on State Food Security 
  
  (1)   (2) 
Variables 
Average Food 
Security Score   
Prevalence of Very 
Food Insecure 
Households 
Medicaid Treatment Effect -0.06  -0.02 
 (0.15)  (0.02) 
Constant 3.58***  0.27*** 
 (0.11)  (0.01) 
R-squared 0.06  0.05 
Time Fixed Effects YES   YES 
State Fixed Effects  YES  YES 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4. Decomposition of Fixed Effect Difference in Difference Measuring into 2x2  
Comparisons of Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Average State Food Security Scores 
  
Treated to Comparison 
Groups of Medicaid 
Expansion 
Estimate Value Weight 
2014 to Untreated -0.03 0.74 
2015 to Untreated 0.13 0.09 
2016 to Untreated -0.18 0.05 
2014 to 2015 -0.27 0.02 
2014 to 2016 -0.65 0.03 
2015 to 2016 0.20 0.00 
2015 to 2014 -0.02 0.03 
2016 to 2014 -0.44 0.03 
2016 to 2015 0.15 0.00 
36 
 
Table 5. Decomposition of Beta Estimate from Fixed Effect Difference in Difference 
Regression Measuring the Impact of Medicaid Expansion on State Food Security 
 Average DD1 Estimate Total Weight 
A. Average State Food Security Score Outcome Variable 
Early Medicaid Expansion 
V. Late Medicaid 
Expansion (control) -0.46 0.06 
Late Medicaid Expansion 
V. Early Medicaid 
Expansion (control) -0.22 0.06 
Medicaid Expansion v. 
Non-Expansion -0.02 0.88 
B. Prevalence Very-Food Insecurity Outcome Variable 
Early Medicaid Expansion 
V. Late Medicaid 
Expansion (control) -0.05 0.06 
Late Medicaid Expansion 
V. Early Medicaid 
Expansion (control) -0.04 0.06 
Medicaid Expansion v. 





Table 6. Fixed Effect Difference in Difference Model Results Measuring the 
Impact of Medicaid on State Food Security with Covariates 









Medicaid 0.03   -0.01 
 (0.15)   (0.02) 
State Less than FPL 0.98**  0.06 
 (0.40)  (0.05) 
State Age -0.04**   -0.00** 
  (0.02)   (0.00) 
State Female 0.85*   0.04 
  (0.48)   (0.06) 
State Married -0.17   0.05 
  (0.59)   (0.07) 
State African American/Black 0.27   0.02 
  (0.73)   (0.09) 
State Hispanic 0.13   0.02 
  (0.78)   (0.09) 
State Unemployment 0.37   0.13 
  (1.00)   (0.12) 
State Number of Children -0.04   -0.10** 
  (0.39)   (0.05) 






State Less than High School Degree 1.07***   0.11* 
  (0.53)   (0.06) 
State Family Size 0.00   0.00 
  (0.26)   (0.03) 
State Republican Power 0.05   0.00 
  (0.12)   (0.01) 
Constant 4.58***   0.47*** 
 (1.09)   (0.13) 
R-squared 0.11   0.11 
Time Fixed Effects YES   YES 
State Fixed Effects YES   YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
All household demographic information is aggregated to the state level by taking the average 




Table 7. Decomposition of Treatment Effect Estimate from FE-DD Regression 
Measuring the Impact of Medicaid Expansion on State Food Security with Covariates 
 
  
 Average DD Estimate Total Weight 
A. Average State Food Security Score Outcome Variable 
Medicaid Expansion  V. Medicaid 
Expanison (control) -0.30 0.13 
Medicaid Expansion v. Non-Expansion 
(control) -0.01 0.83 
Effect from Covariate Variation (within) 2.13 0.04 
B. Prevalence Very-Food Insecure Outcome Variable 
Medicaid Expansion Group  V. Medicaid 
Expanison Group -0.05 0.13 
Medicaid Expansion v. Non-Expansion -0.01 0.83 
Effect from Covariate Variation (within) 0.22 0.04 
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Treatment Weight -17517.4 
(31146.0) 
0.674 




















Figure 4.  2x2 Differenc in Difference Comparisons for Medicaid Expanison on Food 
















































¥ State and Year Fixed Effects Included  
Figure 6. Decomposition of Fixed Effects Difference in Difference Beta Estimate of Medicaid Expansion on Food 





¥ State and Year Fixed Effects Included  
Figure 7. Event Study Estimating the Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Household Food Security Score and Rate of 




¥ State and Year fixed Effects Included and Covariates Age, Sex, Marital Status, Race, Hispanic, Unemployment, Number of Children, Less Than 
High School Diploma, Family Size, State Republican Power 
Figure 8. Decomposition of Fixed Effects Difference in Difference Beta Estimate of Medicaid Expansion on Food 





¥ State and Year fixed Effects Included and Covariates Age, Sex, Marital Status, Race, Hispanic, Unemployment, Number of Children, Less Than 
High School Diploma, Family Size, State Republican Power 
Figure 9. Event Study Estimating the Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Household Food Security Score and Rate of 
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